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INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued 
thirteen precedential opinions in the area of government contracts law.  
Seven of these decisions consisted of bid protests appealed from the 
Court of Federal Claims, making 2018 the “year of the protest,” at least 
in terms of the Federal Circuit’s government contracts jurisprudence.  
Four decisions concerned contractual disputes arising under the 
Contract Disputes Act1 (CDA) regime, and the remaining two decisions 
addressed the scope of the Court of Federal Claims’s jurisdiction to hear 
non-CDA contractual disputes pursuant to the Tucker Act.2 
Before diving into the individual decisions, it is perhaps worth 
reiterating that government contracts cases have always been a small 
portion of the Federal Circuit’s overall docket.  Indeed, in a court 
                                               
 1. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09). 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). 
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that was created primarily to “address the burgeoning federal litigation 
and inter-circuit splits in the area of patent law,” government contracts 
law issues rarely take center stage.3  The passage of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act4 (AIA) and the resulting surge of appeals from the 
newly-formed Patent Trial and Appeal Board have further increased the 
percentage of the court’s docket that is taken up by patent issues.5  
According to annual data published by the court, the number of appeals 
in the area of intellectual property has risen from forty-seven percent of 
the court’s docket in fiscal year 2012 to about sixty-five percent in fiscal 
year 2017.6  In contrast, only about four to five percent of the court’s 
appeals have related to contract law during this same period.7  This 
generally translates to between ten and twenty precedential opinions 
each year on government contracts issues.8 
It is therefore difficult for the Federal Circuit judges to develop a 
significant body of expertise and jurisprudence on government 
contracts law issues.  As noted by the Honorable Jimmie V. Reyna and 
Nathaniel E. Castellano in a 2016 article about successful government 
contracts advocacy before the Federal Circuit: 
These statistics suggest that the Federal Circuit has relatively few 
opportunities to issue precedential opinions that can meaningfully 
contribute to and shape the contours of government contracts law.  
They also suggest that there are not enough government contracts 
cases appealed to the Federal Circuit for the judges, much less 
their clerks, to develop and maintain a high level of working 
knowledge in all aspects of the law of government contracting.9 
                                               
 3. Collin D. Swan, Government Contracts and the Federal Circuit:  A History of Judicial 
Remedies Against the Sovereign, 8 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 105, 114 (2014). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.) (AIA). 
 5. See, e.g., Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:  
Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435, 435–36 (2012) (describing the substantial impact of 
the AIA on patent litigation). 
 6. Compare UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS 
FILED, BY CATEGORY:  FY 2012, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/Caseload_by_Category_Appeals_Filed_2012.pdf (last visited May 20, 
2019), with UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS 
FILED, BY CATEGORY:  FY 2017, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/the-
court/statistics/FY_17_Filings_by_Category.pdf (last visited May 20, 2019). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Dennis J. Callahan et al., 2017 Government Contract Law Decisions of the Federal 
Circuit, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1274 (2018). 
 9. Jimmie V. Reyna & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Successful Advocacy in Government Contracts 
Appeals Before the Federal Circuit:  Context is Key, 46 PUB. CONT. L.J. 209, 209–10 (2016). 
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Professor Steven L. Schooner noted such a trend in his 2010 review 
of the Federal Circuit’s government contracts cases.10  He examined 
the judges’ level of participation in government contracts cases 
during 2010 and concluded that “no judge participated in ten, and 
the vast majority of judges participated in fewer than half a dozen, 
government contracts related matters.”11  Eight years later, Professor 
Schooner’s observations continue to be on point12: 
  
                                               
 10. Steven L. Schooner, A Random Walk:  The Federal Circuit’s 2010 Government 
Contracts Decisions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1067, 1069–72 (2011). 
 11. Id. at 1071. 
 12. Of course, as previously noted by Professor Schooner, case selection 
methodology is not always consistent.  The above table includes only appeals that 
resulted in precedential published opinions.  The Authors also decided not to 
include the Federal Circuit’s decision in Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, which 
addressed certain contractual claims but was largely related to the government’s 
decision to stop making risk corridor payments to health insurance companies under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.  892 F.3d 1311, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 
2018).  The Authors included two other decisions in the above table that are not 
discussed in the Article.  The first, FastShip, LLC v. United States, involved a patent 
infringement suit against the United States in connection with the U.S. Navy’s 
development and production of its Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships.  See 892 F.3d 
1298, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  The second, Starry Associates, Inc. v. United States, 
followed a successful post-award bid protest and addressed the scope of the “special 
factor” exception to the statutory cap to receive attorney fees under the Equal Access 
to Justice Act.  See 892 F.3d 1372, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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Each active judge sitting on the Federal Circuit participated in at 
least one government contracts case in 2018 that resulted in a 
published opinion.  Chief Judge Prost and Judge Wallach were the 
most involved in this year’s set of government contracts opinions, 
having each participated in six cases and each authoring three 
opinions (not including Judge Wallach’s dissent of the court’s denial of 
a petition for rehearing en banc in Cleveland Assets LLC v. United States13). 
Hence, the dearth of government contracts cases before the 
Federal Circuit means that advocates often face a “dauntingly difficult 
task” of conveying their points on “complex issues to an audience that 
may have no direct experience grappling with the particular issues on 
appeal and may even lack a taste for procurement flavored fare.”14 
The Federal Circuit may issue a limited number of government 
contracts decisions each year, but as this year’s decisions show, the 
court continues to serve as the de facto court of last resort on many 
issues facing the government contracts community.15  The court’s 
                                               
 13. 897 F.3d 1332, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
 14. Reyna & Castellano, supra note 9, at 211.  For a discussion of how the 
government contracts community could assist the court in developing its government 
contracts jurisprudence by increasing the use of amicus briefs, see Jayna Marie Rust, 
Note, How to Win Friends and Influence Government Contracts Law:  Improving the Use of 
Amicus Briefs at the Federal Circuit, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 185, 187 (2012). 
 15. See, e.g., Ruth C. Burg, The Role of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in Government Contract Disputes:  A Historic View from the Bench, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 173, 
183 (2012) (“The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to decide appeals relating 
to the contracts of the United States Government and, because Supreme Court 
review is rare, is effectively ‘the court of last resort’ for government agencies and 
their contractors.”); Richard C. Johnson, Beyond Judicial Activism:  Federal Circuit 
Decisions Legislating New Contract Requirements, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 69, 71 (2012) 
(“[B]ecause appeals on certiorari from the [Federal Circuit] to the Supreme Court 
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decisions are thus often significant and have wide-ranging implications 
that every government contracts practitioner should consider. 
I.    BID PROTEST CASES 
A.   Dell Federal Systems, L.P. v. United States 
In Dell Federal Systems, L.P. v. United States,16 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the proper legal standard for reviewing the scope of an 
agency’s decision to take corrective action when faced with a 
protest.17  In particular, the Federal Circuit reversed a line of cases at 
the Court of Federal Claims that had previously required agencies to 
“narrowly tailor” their corrective action to the identified 
procurement errors.18  The Federal Circuit instead applied the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) and held that an agency’s corrective action 
requires only a “rational basis” to be upheld.19  As discussed below, 
this decision may significantly impact bid protest litigation. 
1. Background 
In May 2016, the U.S. Army solicited proposals for indefinite 
delivery, indefinite quantity contracts to procure approximately $5 
billion worth of commercial off-the-shelf computers and other related 
equipment over a ten-year period.20  The contracts were to be 
awarded to the lowest priced technically acceptable offerors.21  Fifty-
eight contractors bid for the contract, but only nine were considered 
technically acceptable.22  All nine contractors were awarded contracts, 
causing a total of twenty-one disappointed bidders to file bid protests 
at the Government Accountability Office (GAO).23 
In response to the protests, the Army acknowledged the existence 
of procurement errors, including ambiguities in the solicitation and 
the Army’s decision not to conduct discussions with offerors despite a 
                                               
are as rare as hens’ teeth, the [Federal Circuit] has in effect become the court of last 
appeal in government contract cases.”). 
 16. 906 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 17. Id. at 991–94. 
 18. Id. at 993. 
 19. Id. at 992, 994–96. 
 20. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 92, 97 (2017). 
 21. Id. at 98. 
 22. Id. at 96. 
 23. Id. 
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regulatory requirement to do so.24  The corrective action involved:  
“(1) opening discussions with all of the remaining offerors, including 
those who filed protests, (2) requesting final revised proposals, and (3) 
issuing a new award decision.”25  The Army also decided to release an 
anonymized list of all the proposed prices from the original procurement 
so that the original awardees would not be at a competitive disadvantage.26 
Dell Federal Systems and Blue Tech Inc., along with five other 
awardees, challenged the scope of the Army’s corrective action in the 
Court of Federal Claims.27  Judge Wheeler found in favor of the 
awardees and imposed a permanent injunction against the Army.28  
Relying on its own precedent under Amazon Web Services, Inc. v. United 
States,29 the court reasoned that the Army’s corrective action was not 
“narrowly tailored” to the defects in the Army’s procurement.30  The 
court stated, “[e]ven where an agency has rationally identified defects 
in its procurement, its corrective action ‘must narrowly target the 
defects it is intended to remedy.’”31 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The Army, along with several protesters, appealed to the Federal 
Circuit, which reversed the Court of Federal Claims’s decision.  In an 
opinion authored by Judge Wallach and joined by Judge Moore and 
Senior Judge Schall, the Federal Circuit rejected the lower court’s 
“narrowly tailored” analysis under Amazon Web Services as contrary to 
the court’s own precedent and inconsistent with the arbitrary and 
capricious standard under the APA.32 
The Federal Circuit criticized the lower court’s reliance on its own 
precedent, stating, “[T]he Court of Federal Claims must follow 
relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, not 
the other way around.”33  In asserting its disapproval of the lower 
                                               
 24. Id. at 99 (“For acquisitions with an estimated value of $100 million or more, 
contracting officers should conduct discussions.” (quoting the Department of 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement § 215.306(c)(1))). 
 25. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 26. Id. at 989. 
 27. Dell Fed. Sys., 133 Fed. Cl. at 100. 
 28. Id. at 107. 
 29. 113 Fed. Cl. 102 (2013). 
 30. Dell Fed. Sys., 133 Fed. Cl. at 104–06. 
 31. Id. at 104 (quoting Amazon Web Servs., 113 Fed. Cl. at 115). 
 32. Dell Fed. Sys., L.P. v. United States, 906 F.3d 982, 986, 993–94 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 33. Id. at 992 (quoting Dellew Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017)). 
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court’s analysis, the Federal Circuit cited precedent showing that it 
had “consistently reviewed agencies’ corrective action under the 
APA’s ‘highly deferential’ ‘rational basis’ standard.”34  The Federal 
Circuit explained that while the Court of Federal Claims attempted to 
frame its standard with rationality and reasonableness, it had actually 
applied a heightened, “narrowly targeted” standard.35  This heightened 
standard was against the precedent of not only the Court of Federal 
Claims but also the Federal Circuit.36  According to the Federal Circuit, 
by asking whether a remedy to an identified error in the bidding process 
was as narrowly tailored as possible, the Court of Federal Claims 
incorrectly applied an overly stringent test for corrective action.37 
The awardees argued that the “narrowly targeted” requirement 
applied by the Court of Federal Claims should not be viewed as a 
separate standard, but instead, should be viewed as an application of 
the “rational basis” standard.38  The Federal Circuit rejected the 
argument, stating that a “narrowly targeted” standard was not found 
in either the statute or its own precedent.39  The APA requires an 
agency to show that it “provided a coherent and reasonable 
explanation of its exercise of discretion.”40  According to the Federal 
Circuit, the “narrowly targeted” standard applied by the Court of 
Federal Claims in this case would undermine the deferential standard 
that an agency is entitled to under the APA.41 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the awardees’ argument that the 
Army’s decision to release all offered prices from the original 
procurement put the awardees at a competitive disadvantage.  First, 
the Federal Circuit found no binding authority that would prohibit 
the Army’s disclosure of the pricing from all offerors.42  In addition, it 
found that the Army had a reasonable explanation for releasing the 
pricing information.43  The Federal Circuit also accepted the 
government’s conclusion that upon rebidding, the release of pricing 
                                               
 34. Id. (quoting Croman Corp. v. United States, 724 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). 
 35. Id. at 992. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 992–93. 
 38. Id. at 993. 
 39. Id. at 994. 
 40. Id. (quoting Banknote Corp. of America, Inc. v. United States, 365 F.3d 1345, 
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 41. Dell Fed. Sys., 906 F.3d at 994. 
 42. Id. at 997. 
 43. Id. 
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information would actually help those offerors who did not put forth 
the lowest price.44  During the rebidding process, those offerors now had 
the chance to revise their proposals and fairly compete with other offerors.45 
The Federal Circuit’s explicit rejection of the lower court’s use of 
the “narrowly tailored” standard means that initial awardees and 
other potential contractors unhappy with an agency’s decision to take 
corrective action will be unlikely to obtain relief unless they can 
demonstrate that the agency failed to act with a rational basis. 
The practical impact of this decision on bid protest litigation may 
be quite significant for at least three reasons.  First, the Court of 
Federal Claims’s “narrowly tailored” standard deviated from the 
highly deferential standard used by GAO to review the 
reasonableness of agency corrective action plans.46  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Dell Federal brings further harmony to 
the legal standards applied by GAO and the Court of Federal Claims.  
Second, the Court of Federal Claims’s decisions reviewing challenges 
to agency corrective action plans were not uniform in their 
application of the “narrowly tailored” standard.  Some cases seemed 
to strictly apply the “narrowly tailored” standard, limiting the 
permissible scope of agency corrective action, while other cases were 
more deferential.  By rejecting the “narrowly tailored” line of cases 
and confirming that the highly deferential APA standard applies, the 
Federal Circuit’s decision may reduce uncertainty in this area of 
procurement law in favor of uniformly deferential review.  Third, and 
perhaps most significantly, agencies facing protests and weighing the 
potential costs and benefits of corrective action previously had to 
consider the risk that their corrective action would immediately 
trigger another round of protest litigation and additional 
procurement delays.  The Federal Circuit’s clear pronouncement that 
corrective action is subject to deferential APA review, and not any 
“narrowly tailored” standard, may provide agencies more certainty and 
maneuverability in their protest response and corrective action 
                                               
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., CSRA LLC, B-415171.3, at 4–5 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 27, 2018) 
(identifying the “broad discretion” agencies have to make corrective action decisions 
in terms of negotiated procurements); Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc., B-292077.2, at 5 
(Comp. Gen. Sept. 4, 2003) (asserting that agencies have the discretion to decide the 
scope of proposed revisions); SMS Data Prods. Grp., Inc., B-280970.4, at 2 (Comp. 
Gen. Jan. 29, 1999) (adding that agency discretion has the purpose of ensuring fair 
and impartial competition). 
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strategies.  This flexibility is particularly important in light of recent 
calls for protest reform.  These calls emerge from perceived concerns 
that serial protests could threaten to paralyze the acquisition process.47 
B.   Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States48 
encourages the government and commercial vendors to collaborate and 
hold each other accountable when conducting business.  The decision 
emphasized the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act’s (FASA) mandate 
that agencies prioritize commercial solutions over developmental 
efforts.49  The Federal Circuit’s decision will impose an obligation on 
agencies to carefully conduct market research and document the 
reasons or explanations for selecting an acquisition strategy.  It may also 
provide commercial companies an incentive to carefully review and 
provide suggestions to the specifications of a solicitation.50 
1. Background 
The Army solicited bids for an upgraded Distributed Common 
Ground System (DCGS-A), an intelligence software that allows the 
Army and other military branches to easily share and access essential 
intelligence information.51  The Army sought potential bidders to 
produce a revamped system, DCGS-A2, to replace the outdated data 
                                               
 47. See, e.g., Richard B. Oliver & Kevin Massoudi, Congress Commissions Study of Bid Protests 
Filed at Both the GAO and COFC, PILLSBURY (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com 
/en/news-and-insights/bid-protests-gao-cofc.html (describing a 2017 congressionally 
mandated study of certain bid protests in order to “advance the efficiency of the acquisition 
system”); Bruce Tsai, Targeting Frivolous Bid Protests by Revisiting the Competition in Contracting 
Act’s Automatic Stay Provision, 13 J. OF CONT. MGMT. 215, 215 (2015) (“[F]rivolous protests are 
a problem . . . .  [P]rotests disrupt the Government-contractor relationship.”). 
 48. 904 F.3d 980 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 49. Id. at 983–84. 
 50. For additional analysis, see Steven L. Schooner, Commercial Products and Services:  
Raising the Market Research Bar or Much Ado About Nothing?, 32 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 52 
(2018) (stating that “[c]ontractors that believe they can provide a commercial product 
that meets the Government’s needs should explicitly inform the Government of their 
capabilities, early in the process, and frequently remind the Government what they bring 
to the table”); Nathaniel Castellano et al., Palantir:  Federal Circuit Confirms Agencies’ 
Obligations to Prioritize Commercial Solutions, ARNOLD & PORTER (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/09/palantir-federal-
circuit-confirms-agencies (identifying the increased opportunity for, and importance of, 
company objections to procurements). 
 51. Palantir USG, Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 218, 222–23 (2016). 
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architecture of the current system.52  More specifically, the 
government wanted the system to “introduce a new and modernized 
data management architecture using a modular system approach to 
perform Army intelligence analysis capabilities.”53 
Palantir USG Inc. (“Palantir”), a contractor that already operated a 
commercial data management system called “Gotham” for the 
Department of Defense, encouraged the Army to use its commercial 
platform, or a modified version, for DCGS-A2.54  The Gotham 
contract was on a firm-fixed price, commercial-item basis.55  However, 
the Army ignored Palantir’s proposals and continued its solicitation 
for DCGS-A2 on a cost-plus basis.56 
Palantir challenged the solicitation at GAO, arguing that the 
government’s developmental approach violated § 2377 of FASA.57  Section 
2377 requires federal agencies to procure commercially available 
technology to the “maximum extent practicable” and to conduct market 
research for existing commercial items or commercial items that could be 
reasonably modified before soliciting proposals.58  GAO denied Palantir’s 
protest, favoring the Army’s developmental approach.59  GAO reasoned 
that no existing commercial contract met the DCGS-A2 specifications, and 
that the Army’s non-commercial developmental approach was reasonably 
related to its needs for the DCGS-A2 system.60 
Undeterred, Palantir filed a bid protest with the Court of Federal 
Claims.61  Judge Marian Blank Horn found that the Army did not 
meet its obligations under § 2377 and permanently enjoined the 
Army from issuing an award for the solicitation.62  The court found 
that the Army’s market research was insufficient.  First, the Army did 
not explain or indicate which commercial items were considered or 
potentially available.63  In addition, the Market Research Report 
failed to acknowledge any commercial items that could have been 
                                               
 52. Id. at 222. 
 53. Id. at 223. 
 54. Id. at 223–24. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 226–32 (outlining Palantir’s multiple responses to the Army’s 
Requests for Information). 
 57. Id. at 234. 
 58. 10 U.S.C § 2377(b), (c) (2012). 
 59. Palantir USG, Inc., B-412746, 2016 WL 3035029, at *4–5 (Comp. Gen. May 18, 2016). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Palantir, 129 Fed. Cl. at 221–22. 
 62. Id. at 282, 295. 
 63. Id. at 276. 
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modified to potentially meet the Army’s needs.64  Even after market 
research was completed, the Army did not consider whether 
Palantir’s data management platform met their requirements.65  
Based on the Army’s lack of discussion regarding commercial items, 
the court found that the Army’s focus on a developmental approach 
early in the process led to the complete exclusion of possible 
commercially available alternatives.66  Judge Horn also emphasized that 
the Army continued with their developmental approach despite 
Palantir’s efforts to inform them that its Gotham platform could be 
modified to satisfy their needs.67 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The government appealed to the Federal Circuit, raising two issues: 
(1) [W]hether the trial court went beyond the statutory and 
regulatory language of FASA and its implementing regulations and 
imposed heightened obligations; and (2) whether the trial court 
wrongly discarded the presumption of regularity and substituted its 
judgment in determining that the Army acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously and in violation of § 2377.68 
The Federal Circuit, in a decision authored by Judge Stoll and 
joined by Judge Newman and Senior Judge Mayer, unanimously 
upheld the lower court’s decision, finding that the Court of Federal 
Claims remained within the scope of the statutory language in § 2377 
and that the presumption of regularity was appropriately discarded.69 
With respect to the first issue, the government argued that the 
Court of Federal Claims improperly heightened the Army’s 
responsibilities for its solicitation under § 2377 because it required 
the Army to “fully investigate” whether any commercial items could 
adequately satisfy the government’s request.70  The Federal Circuit 
rejected this argument.  It found that the Court of Federal Claims 
required the government only to “determine” whether there were 
commercial items that met the Army’s requirements or could be 
modified to meet the Army’s requirements.71  Therefore, the lower 
                                               
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 276–81. 
 68. Palantir USG, Inc., v. United States, 904 F.3d 980, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 69. Id. at 990, 995. 
 70. Id. at 990. 
 71. Id. 
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court correctly applied the standard set forth under § 2377(c)(2).72  
The Federal Circuit noted that while the Court of Federal Claims may 
have used language other than “determine” throughout its opinion, 
read in context, it still had the same meaning as the word 
“determine” under FASA.73  In addition, the Federal Circuit’s de novo 
review of the record led it to the same conclusion:  the Army failed to 
“determine” under § 2377(c)(2) whether there were commercial 
products available during the solicitation process that could “meet 
the agency’s requirements; could be modified to meet the agency’s 
requirements; or could meet the agency’s requirements if those 
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.”74 
The Federal Circuit further noted that the Army was put on notice 
about readily available commercial alternatives when Palantir reached 
out to them.75  Despite that notice, the Army was adamant in taking a 
developmental approach for its solicitation, seeking a bidder that would 
build DCGS-A2 from the ground up.76  Palantir argued that this was a 
complete disregard for § 2377’s requirement to procure commercial 
items to the “maximum extent practicable.”77  The Federal Circuit 
agreed, finding that the Army’s method was arbitrary and capricious.78 
As for the second issue, the government argued that the Army was 
entitled to a presumption of regularity that had not been rebutted 
because it had conducted sufficient market research.79  A 
presumption of regularity does not require an agency to provide a 
reason or explanation for its determination.80  However, under the APA, 
even if an explanation is not required, a reviewing court has the power 
to require one if the presumption is “rebutted by record evidence 
suggesting that the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious.”81 
After thoroughly reviewing the record evidence, the Federal Circuit 
rejected the Army’s argument and found that the Army’s solicitation was 
arbitrary and capricious.82  It found that the Army’s market research 
                                               
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at 994. 
 77. Id. at 983. 
 78. Id. at 990. 
 79. Id. at 995. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 
238 F.3d 1324, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 82. Id. 
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failed to consider any commercially available alternatives that “(A) meet 
the agency’s requirements; (B) could be modified to meet the agency’s 
requirements; or (C) could meet the agency’s requirements if those 
requirements were modified to a reasonable extent.”83 
The Palantir decision is the first time that the Court of Federal 
Claims and the Federal Circuit provided an in-depth analysis of a 
federal agency’s obligations under FASA to consider commercial 
solutions and opportunities.  Following the Federal Circuit’s 
affirmation, agencies will likely become more accommodating to 
contractors that provide commercial goods and services.  When it 
comes to technology and innovation, the government has lagged 
behind the private sector and commercial markets.  By imposing 
responsibilities upon federal agencies under FASA’s mandate, this 
decision will likely increase the adoption of commercial practices in 
the public sector and close the gap. 
Palantir is also likely to require federal agencies to take more 
caution in documenting their market research and their reasons for 
their solicitation strategy, especially if they choose to use a 
developmental approach.  The decision opens a door for commercial 
companies to more frequently challenge an agency’s decision to solicit 
goods or services on a non-commercial basis, especially if those 
companies are able to present evidence showing that the agency had 
notice of alternative commercial solutions but chose to act otherwise.  
If an agency receives such notice, it should be careful to research and 
document the reasons why it chose to use a non-commercial approach. 
C.   Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States 
Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States84 is a pre-award bid protest 
decision that initially promised to resolve a divide among Court of 
Federal Claims judges as to whether “prudential standing” 
requirements apply to bid protests.  Instead of reaching the issue of 
prudential standing, the Federal Circuit made a relatively surprising 
decision that the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction on the basis that Cleveland Assets was challenging the 
solicitation’s compliance with an “appropriation statute” instead of a 
“procurement statute.”85  While Cleveland Assets will not impact most 
                                               
 83. Id. at 994. 
 84. 883 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 85. See id. at 1381 (affirming the dismissal of Count II, but for lack of jurisdiction 
rather than lack of standing). 
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bid protests, it may serve as a previously unforeseen limit to the Court of 
Federal Claims’s bid protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b).86 
1. Background 
Cleveland Assets arose from a Government Services Administration 
(GSA) Request for Lease Proposals (RLP) seeking a secure space for 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Cleveland Field Office.  
The FBI Cleveland Field Office was housed in a building leased from 
Cleveland Assets since February 2002.  The lease was initially set to 
expire in January 2012 but was extended multiple times.87 
Under 40 U.S.C. § 3307, GSA must seek approval of two 
congressional committees before obligating funds on a lease where 
the annual rent will exceed $2.85 million.88  This statute requires GSA 
to submit a prospectus describing, among other things, the property 
it intends to lease and an estimate of the price it will ultimately pay.89 
In 2009, GSA began preparing for a new lease for the FBI 
Cleveland Field Office.90  It provided the congressional committees 
with a final prospectus in December 2010 that set forth an estimated 
rental rate of $26.00 per square foot.91  By September 2011, the 
relevant committees adopted resolutions approving the prospectus at 
that rate.92  Over five years later, GSA issued an RLP that, pursuant to 
§ 3307, stated GSA would award a lease only if the offered rental rate 
did not exceed the “[c]ongressionally-imposed rent limitation” of 
$26.00 per square foot.93  The Federal Circuit’s decision explained 
that pursuant to the lease extensions, “GSA has paid, and continues 
to pay, Cleveland Assets a penalty rate of $44.72 per rentable square 
foot (“PSF”) since the expiration of the original 10-year period.”94 
                                               
 86. See generally Stuart W. Turner & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Federal Circuit Implies 
Narrowing of Claims Court Jurisdiction, ARNOLD & PORTER (Mar. 12, 2018), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/03/fed-circ-imp 
lies-narrowing-of-claims-court (describing the implications of the Cleveland Assets 
decision on Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction). 
 87. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 264, 267–68 (2017). 
 88. Id. at 268 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 3307(a)(2) (2012)). 
 89. Id. (citing § 3307(b)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 270. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 271. 
 94. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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Cleveland Assets filed a pre-award bid protest challenging the RLP 
under three relevant allegations.95  Count II asserted that GSA exceeded 
its authority to solicit offers under § 3307, and Counts III and IV alleged 
that the $26.00 PSF limitation was unreasonably low, imposed an undue 
restriction on competition and shifted all risk to the contractor.96 
Judge Kaplan of the Court of Federal Claims granted judgment on 
the administrative record in favor of the government on Counts III 
and IV because it found that GSA did not abuse its discretion when it 
selected the $26.00 PSF rental cap.97  The court dismissed Count II 
because, although it considered that Cleveland Assets may have had 
standing as an “interested party” under the Tucker Act, it found that 
Cleveland Assets lacked the “prudential standing” necessary to bring a 
claim.98  Prudential standing is a doctrine that originated in the 
administrative law context.  Even if a plaintiff challenging the 
government’s violation of a statute has some interest in the 
government’s action, to have “prudential” standing, those interests 
must be within the “zone of interests protected or regulated by the 
statutory provision” at issue—i.e. the statute must have, in some 
sense, been enacted to protect or control entities in the plaintiff’s 
position.99  However, the judges of the Court of Federal Claims are 
divided on whether the requirements of prudential standing apply in 
protest cases brought under the Tucker Act.100 
Judge Kaplan found that Congress did not exempt the Tucker Act 
from the prudential standing requirement.101  Judge Kaplan further 
ruled that Cleveland Assets’ interest in keeping the current FBI lease 
(or winning a new one) is not within the “zone of interests” protected 
by the appropriations rules set out in § 3307.102  Judge Kaplan explained 
that while § 3307(a) requires an agency to secure approval from two 
                                               
 95. Cleveland Assets, 132 Fed. Cl. at 267. 
 96. Id. at 267, 274. 
 97. See id. at 279–82 (finding that GSA reasonably determined the rental rate for the RLP). 
 98. Id. at 275–77. 
 99. Id. at 275 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)). 
 100. Compare MORI Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 503, 542 (2011) 
(stating that the zone of interests standard does “not apply to bid protests brought as 
a breach of the duty to fairly and honestly consider bids”), and Santa Barbara 
Applied Research, Inc. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 536, 544 (2011) (determining 
prudential standing does not apply under § 1491(b)), with Hallmark-Phoenix 3, LLC 
v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 65, 70 (2011) (holding prudential standing does apply to 
cases brought under 1491(b)). 
 101. Cleveland Assets, 132 Fed. Cl. at 277. 
 102. Id. at 275. 
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congressional committees in order to enter into a lease over a specified 
dollar amount, the purpose of the statute was not to protect a private 
contractor such as Cleveland Assets.103  The goal of § 3307(a) was to provide 
congressional oversight over certain agency actions, and certainly not to 
provide private parties or contractors an avenue for judicial review.104 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
Cleveland Assets appealed the Court of Federal Claims’s 
decision.105  With respect to Cleveland Assets’ claim that the RLP 
violated § 3307, the parties’ briefing focused entirely on whether the 
Court of Federal Claims correctly applied the “prudential standing” 
requirement.  Cleveland Assets argued that the standing requirement 
for bid protests is only that the protester be an “interested party” and 
does not include any “zone of interest” requirement.106  The 
government, in turn, argued that the Court of Federal Claims properly 
imposed a zone of interest test.107 
While the oral argument, held before Judges Moore, Hughes, and 
Stoll, initially focused on the issue of prudential standing, the panel 
indicated during the government’s response an interest in whether 
§ 3307 is a “procurement statute” that could be enforced in the bid 
protest process at all.108 
This line of reasoning carried through to the unanimous opinion, 
authored by Judge Moore, which declined to reach the prudential 
standing issue at all and instead held that § 1491(b) confers 
jurisdiction only over challenges in connection with a 
procurement.109  It does not cover allegations of a violation of § 3307 
                                               
 103. Id. at 277. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 106. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 3–4, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 
F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2113) (contending that a party has standing in a bid 
protest if it is an actual or prospective bidder and has a direct economic interest in the bid). 
 107. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 15, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 
883 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2113) (agreeing with the trial court that 
Cleveland Assets challenges lacked standing to challenge because it was in the “zone 
of interests” authorizing the appropriations for leases under § 3307). 
 108. See Oral Argument at 32:00, Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 
1378 (No. 17-2113), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings?title=cl 
eveland+assets&field_case_number_value=&field_date_value2%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdat%5D= 
(questioning whether an appropriation statute has any connection to procurements). 
 109. See Cleveland Assets, 883 F.3d at 1381. 
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because it is “an appropriation, not a procurement, statute.”110  The 
Federal Circuit was concerned about unnecessarily expanding the 
scope of bid protest jurisdiction.111  The decision also proves the 
court’s strong preference for plain language interpretation, noting 
that “the word ‘procurement’ is nowhere to be found in § 3307” 112: 
While the Claims Court dismissed Count II on prudential standing 
grounds, we need not reach that issue because the plain language 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) expressly precludes Claims Court 
jurisdiction over Count II of the complaint.  Section 1491(b)(1) 
only confers jurisdiction over challenges to statutes or regulations 
“in connection with a procurement or proposed procurement.”  28 
U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) . . . .  We have previously interpreted § 1491(b) 
to extend only to actions in which “the government at least 
initiated a procurement, or initiated ‘the process for determining a 
need’ for acquisition.”  The phrase “procurement” therefore limits 
the types of government action that the Claims Court has 
jurisdiction to review under § 1491(b).  If plaintiffs could allege 
any statutory or regulatory violation tangentially related to a 
government procurement, § 1491(b)(1) jurisdiction risks 
expanding far beyond the procurement context. 
The only statute alleged to be violated by Cleveland Assets in Count 
II is 40 U.S.C. § 3307, an appropriation, not a procurement, 
statute.  The plain text of § 3307 demonstrates that the statute is 
directed to “appropriations [being] made only” pursuant to approval 
by the specified congressional committees.  While the word 
“procurement” is nowhere to be found in the statute, “appropriation” 
is used eight times. 
The statutory structure confirms our plain language reading of the 
statute.  The structure of 40 U.S.C. § 3307 directs GSA how to apply 
for an appropriation, but it says nothing of how GSA must run its 
procurement once the appropriation is made . . . .  If we were to 
read § 3307 as a procurement statute, every appropriations bill and 
rider would become a potential source of challenge for any 
interested party under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).113 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the Court of Federal Claims 
holding that Cleveland Assets had not shown GSA’s decision to 
                                               
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1381–82. 
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impose a $26.00 PSF rent cap to be arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law.114 
3. On petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc 
Cleveland Assets filed a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing 
en banc—both petitions were denied.115  The petitions argued that 
the panel erred in finding that Cleveland Assets’ claim fell beyond 
the Court of Federal Claims’s jurisdiction and that prudential 
standing does not apply to bid protests under § 1491(b).116  Judge 
Wallach, joined by Judge Newman, dissented from the denial of en 
banc rehearing.117  Judge Wallach voiced several concerns with the 
panel’s conclusion that Cleveland Assets’ claim fell beyond the scope 
of § 1491(b) jurisdiction, emphasizing prior Federal Circuit 
precedent describing the broad scope of § 1491(b).118 
On balance, Cleveland Assets is unlikely to impact most bid protests 
brought under § 1491(b), which often allege violations of the 
Competition in Contracting Act119 and the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR).120  However, in more unique protests that test 
jurisdictional limits, such as those challenging the award of an Other 
Transaction Agreement,121 the holding of Cleveland Assets that 
§ 1491(b) extends only to alleged violations of “procurement” 
statutes may prove to be an important limitation on the Court of 
Federal Claims’s bid protest jurisdiction.  Moreover, it appears that 
the Court of Federal Claims remains divided as to whether prudential 
standing applies as an additional limit to bid protest standing. 
                                               
 114. See id. at 1382 (noting that the standard of review is highly deferential to the 
agency and Cleveland Assets did not meet its burden of proof). 
 115. Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 897 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 
 116. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Combined Petition for Rehearing at 6, Cleveland Assets, 
LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2113). 
 117. Cleveland Assets, 897 F.3d at 1333 (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
 118. See id. (arguing that the majority opinion narrows the court’s jurisdiction too 
much and could set a negative precedent for future cases). 
 119. Pub. L. No. 98-396, §§ 2701–2753, 98 Stat. 494, 1175 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3312 (2012)). 
 120. See FAR ch. 1 (2018).  The FAR provides the principal set of rules for 
government procurement by federal executive agencies in the United States. 
 121. See generally Stuart W. Turner & Nathaniel Castellano, Other Transactions Authority 
(OTA):  Protests and Disputes, ARNOLD & PORTER (June 28, 2018), https://www.arnold 
porter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/other-transactions-authority-ota-protests 
(explaining that Other Transaction Authority “is a rubric describing a set of statutes that 
explicitly grant certain agencies the authority to enter into agreements other than 
procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements”). 
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D.   PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States 
In PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States,122 the Federal Circuit 
resolved an existing conflict between two statutory schemes designed 
to give contracting preferences to “two historically disadvantaged 
groups:  veterans and disabled persons.”123  This case required the 
Federal Circuit to once again address the scope of the Department of 
Veterans Affairs’ (VA) obligations to consider setting aside 
procurements for competition among veteran-owned small businesses 
through a process known as the “Rule of Two”124 under the Veterans 
Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006 
(VBA).125  Just two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court considered this 
statute in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States126 and held that 
the VBA “unambiguously requires the [VA] to use the Rule of Two 
before contracting under the competitive procedures.”127 
At the same time, the Javits-Wagner O’Day Act128 (JWOD) requires 
all federal government agencies to procure designated products and 
services from qualified nonprofit agencies operated by, and employing, 
blind or significantly disabled individuals.129  The Federal Circuit 
addressed the conflict between the VBA (as interpreted by Kingdomware) 
and the JWOD and concluded that the VA must follow the VBA’s Rule 
of Two requirement in every procurement;130 the VA cannot circumvent 
the VBA’s requirement by turning to JWOD-mandated sources. 
1. Background 
The JWOD’s mandatory sourcing requirements are fulfilled 
through a procurement list of eligible products and services (the 
“List”) that is maintained by the Committee for Purchase from 
People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled (the “AbilityOne 
                                               
 122. 907 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 123. Id. at 1348. 
 124. See id. at 1350 (explaining that the Rule of Two is a congressional “preference 
for awarding contracts restricted to veteran-owned small business[es]” (citing 38 
U.S.C. § 8127(d))). 
 125. Pub. L. No. 109-461, 120 Stat. 3403 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections in 38 U.S.C.). 
 126. 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016). 
 127. Id. at 1976. 
 128. Pub. L. No. 92-28, 85 Stat. 77 (1971) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 8501–06 (2012)). 
 129. See 41 U.S.C. § 8504 (codifying the requirement that all procurements under 
§ 8503 come from a qualified nonprofit agency). 
 130. PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 907 F.3d 1345, 1357–61 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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Commission”).131  In the early 2000s, before passage of the VBA, the 
AbilityOne Commission added to the List eyewear and eyewear 
prescription services provided by the VA through two Veterans 
Integrated Service Networks (VISNs), and the VA awarded contracts 
for these services to Winston-Salem Industries for the Blind 
(Industries for the Blind).132  Then in February 2016, after the VBA’s 
enactment but before the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingdomware, 
the AbilityOne Commission published a notice proposing to add to 
the List eyewear services under another one of the VA’s VISNs.133  
The Kingdomware decision was released shortly thereafter, which 
prompted PDS Consultants (PDS)—a service-disabled veteran-owned 
small business that provides eyewear services—to write to the 
AbilityOne Commission and assert that the Commission’s proposal to 
add additional VISNs to the List would violate the VA’s obligation under 
the VBA to consider setting aside all procurements to veteran-owned 
small businesses.134  The AbilityOne Commission considered PDS’s 
comments but ultimately voted to add the additional VISN to the List.135 
PDS filed a bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking an 
injunction requiring the VA to perform the Rule of Two analysis 
mandated by the VBA when procuring eyewear services under any of 
the agency’s VISNs.136  Under the VBA’s Rule of Two requirement, 
the VA must set aside a contract for competition among veteran-
owned small businesses if the contracting officer reasonably expects 
that two or more veteran-owned small businesses will compete for the 
contract.137  PDS pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kingdomware to argue that the VBA’s Rule of Two requirement took 
priority over the JWOD.138 
The Court of Federal Claims ruled in favor of PDS and held that 
the VBA’s Rule of Two took priority over the JWOD for all VA 
procurements.139  It explained that the decision in Kingdomware 
obligates the VA to use the Rule of Two, and that the VBA should take 
                                               
 131. Id. at 1348–49. 
 132. Id. at 1352–53. 
 133. Id. at 1353. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1353–54. 
 136. See generally PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 117 (2017). 
 137. Id. at 119. 
 138. Id. at 120. 
 139. Id. at 128. 
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priority over the JWOD because it was “more specific.”140  The court 
also noted that the VBA priority applies only to VA procurements, 
while the JWOD applies to all federal agency procurements.141 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
The United States and Industries for the Blind appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.142  In an opinion authored by Judge O’Malley and 
joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Stoll, the Federal Circuit upheld 
the Court of Federal Claims’s decision and held that the VA must use 
the Rule of Two even when goods and services are on the List.143 
The Federal Circuit first considered various arguments by the 
Industries for the Blind that the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear PDS’s claims.  Industries for the Blind argued 
that:  (1) PDS’s protest was nothing more than a challenge to the validity 
of the AbilityOne Program as a whole and VA regulations that could 
only be heard in district court under the APA; and (2) the “purchases 
from the List ‘are not ‘procurements’ for purposes of Tucker Act 
jurisdiction.”144  The Federal Circuit rejected these arguments and held 
that PDS’s “claims fall squarely within Tucker Act jurisdiction.”145  The 
court found that PDS alleged a statutory violation relating to the VA’s 
procurements—“namely, that the VA acted in violation of the VBA by 
awarding contracts without first conducting the Rule of Two analysis.”146  
In an effort to distinguish this case from its earlier decision in Cleveland 
Assets, the court noted that none of the parties disputed that “the VBA is 
a statute that relates to all VA procurements” and is thus “[f]ar from 
being ‘tangentially related to a government procurement.’”147  Hence, 
the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims properly found 
that it had jurisdiction over PDS’s claims. 
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the plain language of both the 
VBA and the JWOD and explained that it needed to determine:  (1) 
                                               
 140. Id. at 127–28. 
 141. Id. at 119–20. 
 142. See generally PDS Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 907 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 143. Id. at 1360. 
 144. Id. at 1355.  The Federal Circuit explained in a footnote that the government was 
not appealing the Court of Claims’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction and had “taken 
the opposing view in related litigation, contending that such actions are essentially bid 
protests that fall under the [Court of Federal Claims’s] jurisdiction.”  Id. at 1355 n.6. 
 145. Id. at 1356. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (quoting Cleveland Assets, LLC v. United States, 883 F.3d 1378, 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 2018)). 
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whether the statutes conflict with each other and, if so, to what extent; 
and (2) whether an alternative means for reconciling the provisions 
can be found in standard principles of statutory interpretation.148 
With respect to the first issue, the VA argued that the statutes do not 
conflict because the VBA applied only to “non-mandatory, competitive 
awards.”149  The Federal Circuit rejected the argument and explained that: 
[B]y its express language, the [VBA] applies to all contracts—not 
only competitive contracts.  The statute requires that, when the Rule 
of Two is triggered—i.e., when “the contracting officer has a 
reasonable expectation that two or more small business concerns 
owned and controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the 
award can be made at a fair and reasonable price that offers best 
value to the United States”—the VA must apply competitive 
mechanisms to determine to whom the contract should be awarded.150 
As for the second issue, the court found that an alternative means 
could be found in standard principles of statutory interpretation 
because specific statutes take priority over general ones.151  The 
Federal Circuit pointed to Congress’s intent when it enacted the VBA 
to explain that the VBA was more specific than the JWOD: 
While the JWOD applies to all agencies of the federal government, the 
VBA applies only to VA procurements and only when the Rule of Two is 
satisfied.  The express, specific directives in § 8127(d), thus, override the 
more general contracting requirements of the JWOD . . . .  The VBA, 
moreover, was expressly enacted to “increase contracting opportunities 
for small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans and . . . by 
veterans with service-connected disabilities.”  Consistent with the VA’s duty 
to support and champion the veteran community, the VBA created the 
Veterans First Contracting Program (“Veterans First”), which requires the 
VA to give “contracting priority” to qualified service-disabled veteran-
owned small businesses and veteran-owned small businesses.  And it 
specifies that the Secretary, “[i]n procuring goods and services pursuant 
to a contracting preference under this title or any other provision of law . . . 
shall give priority to a small business concern owned and controlled by 
veterans, if such business concern also meets the requirements of that 
contracting preference.”152 
                                               
 148. Id. at 1357, 1358. 
 149. Id. at 1358. 
 150. Id. (citation omitted). 
 151. See id. (explaining that under basic tenets of statutory construction, specific 
statutes take precedence over general ones). 
 152. Id. at 1358–59 (citations omitted). 
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The Federal Circuit also considered the fact that the VBA was enacted 
years after the JWOD.  Since Congress enacted the VBA over thirty years 
after the JWOD, the Federal Circuit inferred that the VBA controls VA 
procurements while the JWOD dictates broader non-VA procurements.153 
Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that Congress had passed a 
similar statute in 2003—the Veteran Benefits Act—that gave the VA 
the discretion to consider setting aside procurements for service-
disabled veteran-owned small businesses, but explicitly exempted the 
JWOD’s mandatory sourcing requirement.154  The court thus 
“assume[d] that Congress was aware that it wrote an exception into 
the agency-wide Veterans Benefits Act in 2003 when it left that very 
same exception out of the VBA only three years later.”155 
The decision in PDS Consultants, Inc. once again provides a strict 
reading of the VBA’s provisions and reiterates that the VA is required 
to use the Rule of Two for all of its procurements.  This decision is a 
logical extension of Kingdomware and the agency-specific 
requirements that the VBA imposes on the VA.  Nevertheless, this 
decision will undeniably be seen as a blow to the AbilityOne program, 
as well as the many blind and disabled individuals who are dependent 
on the AbilityOne program to earn a living. 
E.   AgustaWestland North America, Inc. v. United States 
AgustaWestland North America, Inc. v. United States156 is another decision 
that provides further guidance on the scope of the court’s bid protest 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b).  AgustaWestland filed a pre-award 
protest challenging an Army sole source Justification & Approval (J&A).157  
After the Court of Federal Claims sustained the protest, the Federal Circuit 
reversed on three grounds in a decision that shows the Federal Circuit’s 
tendency to narrow the scope of § 1491(b) jurisdiction for unique claims.158 
1. Background 
In 2006, following full and open competition in which AgustaWestland 
submitted an unsuccessful proposal, the Army awarded Airbus a contract 
to provide 322 Light Utility Helicopters over the course of ten years.159  
                                               
 153. Id. at 1359 (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998)). 
 154. Id. at 1349–50. 
 155. Id. at 1359. 
 156. 880 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 157. See id. at 1329–30. 
 158. See id. at 1335. 
 159. Id. at 1328. 
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The contract required that Airbus provide eight UH-72A Lakota 
helicopters in the first year and provided the Army with the option to 
purchase up to 483 additional Lakotas.160 
In accordance with an initiative to reduce the defense budget, in 
2013 the Army issued the Aviation Restructure Initiative “designed to 
deliver the best Army Aviation force possible within resource 
constraints.”161  This included “redistributing of assets” and “reducing 
aircraft types and standardizing Aviation brigade designs.”162 
The Army then issued a policy decision designating the Lakota as 
the “Institutional Training Helicopter” at Fort Rucker through an 
Army Execution Order on April 3, 2014.163  The Army determined 
that it needed to increase the number of Lakotas from 317 to 427.164  
To obtain these additional aircraft, the Army exercised all remaining 
options under the Airbus contract but was sixteen Lakotas short of its 
objective.165  Because Airbus had exclusive ownership over the data 
rights required to produce and maintain the Lakotas, the Army was 
faced with the prospect of either purchasing sixteen additional Lakotas 
on a sole source basis from Airbus or procuring sixteen alternate 
aircraft.166  The Army chose to issue a sole source award to Airbus for the 
remaining sixteen Lakotas, supported by a J&A explaining the costs and 
delay associated with procuring and sustaining an alternate aircraft.167 
AgustaWestland filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing that 
the Execution Order designating the Lakota as the institutional training 
helicopter was an improper procurement decision.168  AgustaWestland 
also challenged the Army’s sole source award for the sixteen remaining 
Lakotas.169 
Court of Federal Claims Judge Braden sustained AgustaWestland’s 
protest.170  Judge Braden first held that the Army’s “Execution Order” was a 
“procurement” decision that contravened the Competition in Contracting 
                                               
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1329. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 127 Fed. Cl. 793, 801 (2016). 
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 170. Id. at 798. 
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Act and the FAR.171  Judge Braden then granted AgustaWestland’s motion 
to supplement the administrative record with respect to the sole source 
award and held that the decision to purchase the additional sixteen aircraft 
was arbitrary and capricious.172  The Army appealed. 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
In an unanimous decision authored by Judge Hughes and joined 
by Chief Judge Prost and Judge Chen, the Federal Circuit reversed all 
three of the Court of Federal Claims’s holdings.173  First, the Federal 
Circuit held that the Execution Order was a policy decision, not a 
protestable decision made “in connection with a procurement” that fell 
within the court’s jurisdiction.174  While many Federal Circuit decisions 
expound on the broad nature of the court’s protest jurisdiction under  
§ 1491(b), the AgustaWestland opinion adds to the body of cases tending 
to narrow the scope of that jurisdiction for unique claims: 
[In Distributed Solutions w]e clarified that to “establish jurisdiction 
pursuant to this definition, [a contractor] must demonstrate that 
the government at least initiated a procurement, or initiated ‘the 
process for determining a need’ for acquisition.” 
One objective of the restructuring initiative, formalized in the 
Execution Order, was to “[r]eplace the aging Aviation institutional 
training fleet at Fort Rucker.”  To accomplish this objective, the 
initiative instructed that “the Institutional Training Helicopter fleet 
is converted to UH-72s and the legacy TH-67 training helicopter is 
divested.”  The initiative did not, however, direct or even discuss 
the procurement of UH-72A Lakota helicopters.  In fact, the 
initiative only contemplated using existing Army assets. 
The Execution Order, therefore, was not a procurement decision 
subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction because it did not begin “the 
process for determining a need for property or services.”  The 
                                               
 171. See id. at 810–11 (noting that because the Army’s Execution Order determined a 
need for property, it was a “quintessential procurement decision” that failed to satisfy the 
requisite “justification review for other than a full and open competition”). 
 172. See id. at 817 (reasoning that “since the entire purpose of a J&A [justification 
and approval] is to explain and justify why competition is not required for a 
procurement, the Contracting Officer’s decision that ‘the justification [is] adequate 
to support other than full competition,’ prior to the review and approval of Legal 
Counsel and the SCA prima facie was arbitrary and capricious”). 
 173. AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 880 F.3d 1326 (2018). 
 174. Id. at 1330–31. 
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Execution Order simply formalized the Army’s decision designating 
the UH-72A Lakota as the Army’s training helicopter.175 
Second, in a ruling reminiscent to its earlier decision in Axiom 
Resource Management, Inc. v. United States,176 the Federal Circuit held 
that the lower court erred in allowing AgustaWestland to supplement 
the administrative record.  The Federal Circuit explained that the 
Court of Federal Claims had an obligation to show why the omitted 
evidence from the record did not allow the court to conduct 
“effective judicial review” of the ultimate issue in the case.177  Instead, 
the Court of Federal Claims merely provided conclusory statements 
“that it could not conduct effective judicial review without the 
supplemented material.”178  The Federal Circuit thus held that the 
administrative record was sufficient to review the Army’s procurement 
award and concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion by 
supplementing the record[] and relying on the supplemental evidence 
to reach its decision.”179 
According to the Federal Circuit, the Court of Federal Claims did 
not explain why the current record was insufficient before permitting 
supplementation of the record.  Instead, the lower court merely 
concluded that it would not be able to conduct “effective judicial 
review” without providing any evidence to support that position.180 
Finally, the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s 
determination that the J&A in support of the Army’s sole source 
award was inadequate.181  Instead, the Federal Circuit found that the 
agency provided “a coherent and reasonable explanation of its 
exercise of discretion, and therefore the justifications for the sole-
source award are not arbitrary and capricious.”182  The J&A relied on 
two justifications:  (1) significant duplicated costs in procuring and 
sustaining a different aircraft that would not be recovered through 
                                               
 175. Id. (citations omitted). 
 176. 564 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  In Axiom Resource Management, the Federal 
Circuit concluded “that the trial court abused its discretion . . . by adding Axiom’s 
documents to the record without evaluating whether the record before the agency 
was sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review.”  Id. at 1380. 
 177. AgustaWestland, 880 F.3d at 1331–32. 
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competition, and (2) unacceptable delays in the Army’s missions, 
exposing the nation to security and safety risks.183 
The first justification was supported by an Independent 
Government Estimate of the cost of duplicating another competitive 
action.184  Notably, the Court of Federal Claims criticized the Army 
for failing to consider the premium Airbus could charge for its 
intellectual property, or whether Airbus could extract a supra-
competitive premium for the Lakotas.185  The Federal Circuit found 
this concern to be irrelevant.  The Federal Circuit noted that Airbus 
already refused a prior government request for an estimation of 
intellectual property costs and informed the government the data was 
not for sale.  Since Airbus was unwilling to sell the data, the potential 
increased costs of intellectual property was irrelevant.186 
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s decision in AgustaWestland 
demonstrates the discretion afforded to agencies in making certain 
requirements determinations, as well as the court’s view of the limits 
of bid protest jurisdiction under § 1491(b). 
F.   CliniComp International, Inc. v. United States 
In CliniComp International v. United States,187 an incumbent 
contractor—CliniComp—protested a sole-source award to a different 
contractor to provide an electronic health records (EHR) system to 
the VA.188  The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the protest due to a 
lack of standing, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the 
lower court did not err in holding that CliniComp lacked the requisite 
experience to perform the large-scale sole-source contract.189  The 
Federal Circuit’s decision could be read to require pre-award protestors 
who challenge solicitation terms to prove standing by showing they 
would have qualified to compete for the contract.190 
                                               
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1333–34. 
 186. Id. (citations omitted). 
 187. 904 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 188. Id. at 1356–57. 
 189. Id. at 1357, 1359. 
 190. See generally Stuart W. Turner & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Federal Circuit Ruling 
Highlights Bid Protester Standing Issues, ARNOLD & PORTER (Sept. 25, 2018), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/09/fed-circ-rul 
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standing jurisprudence and explaining the potential impacts of the CliniComp decision). 
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1. Background 
In 2011, the VA and the Department of Defense (DOD) 
determined that they would both upgrade their EHR systems.  Their 
intention was to have one “common system” that supports 
interoperability between the agencies.191  The DOD upgraded its EHR 
system first.192  In 2015, it procured an EHR system that consisted 
primarily of commercial software developed by Cerner Corporation 
(Cerner).193  Then, in 2017, the VA Secretary issued a Determination 
& Findings (D&F) to contract with Cerner on a sole-source award 
basis, relying on the public-interest exception under the Competition 
in Contracting Act to avoid full and open competition.194 
Subsequently, CliniComp protested the proposed Cerner contract, 
contending that it should have gone through a competitive process.195  
To support this contention, CliniComp argued that the VA “failed to 
engage in advance planning” and that “the Secretary’s award decision 
[was] a brand-name justification.”196 
Judge Griggsby of the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the 
protest, finding that CliniComp lacked standing because it failed to 
show that it had a “direct economic interest.”197  To satisfy the “direct 
economic interest” requirement, CliniComp had to show that it had a 
“substantial chance of receiving the contract” if the VA used a 
competitive process.198  Unfortunately for CliniComp, the Court of 
Federal Claims concluded that CliniComp did not have sufficient 
experience in EHR services to compete for the contract described in 
the VA Secretary’s D&F.199  In evaluating CliniComp’s experience, the 
court compared the dollar value, scope, and nature of CliniComp’s 
prior work for the VA with the proposed Cerner contract.200 
The Court of Federal Claims also rejected CliniComp’s argument 
that it could have provided an “alternative solution” to satisfy the VA’s 
needs, explaining:  “[T]he question before the Court is not whether 
                                               
 191. CliniComp Int’l, 904 F.3d at 1356. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. (noting that the DOD awarded Cerner a $4.3 billion contract for the 
EHR system). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1357. 
 196. CliniComp Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 736, 748 (2017). 
 197. Id. at 749. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 749–52. 
 200. Id. at 750–52. 
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CliniComp could offer the VA an alternative solution.  But, rather, 
whether CliniComp could compete for the contract that the 
Secretary has decided to award to Cerner.”201 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
CliniComp appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the 
Court of Federal Claims and dismissed the protest for lack of 
standing.202  In an opinion authored by Chief Judge Prost and joined 
by Judges Wallach and Toronto, the Federal Circuit found that there 
was no “clear error” when the Court of Federal Claims determined 
that CliniComp did not have the relevant experience to compete for 
the proposed Cerner contract.203 
CliniComp raised a series of arguments.  First, it contended that 
the Court of Federal Claims incorrectly applied the standard adopted 
in Myers Investigative and Security Services, Inc. v. United States,204 which 
requires the protestor to show that it “could compete for the contract if 
the bid process were made competitive.”205  CliniComp asserted that 
the court should have instead applied the standard from Weeks Marine, 
Inc. v. United States,206 which requires the protestor to show only a “non-
trivial competitive injury which can be addressed by judicial relief.”207  
The Federal Circuit ultimately concluded that the Myers standard was 
the proper standard.208  However, it explained that even if the Weeks 
Marine standard were applied, CliniComp would still lack standing: 
CliniComp failed to show that it was a qualified bidder . . . .  Absent 
such a showing, CliniComp could not satisfy the “non-trivial 
competitive injury” standard for prejudice set forth in Weeks 
Marine . . . .  [A]lthough we apply the standard for prejudice as 
articulated in Myers, our conclusion would be the same applying the 
“non-trivial competitive injury” standard set forth in Weeks Marine.209 
Second, the Federal Circuit rejected CliniComp’s argument that 
there was no way for the Court of Federal Claims to determine that it 
was “incapable of performing the contract” because the requirements 
                                               
 201. Id. at 751. 
 202. CliniComp Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.3d 1353, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 203. Id. at 1359. 
 204. 275 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 205.  Id. at 1370 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 206. 575 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 207. CliniComp Int’l, 904 F.3d at 1358–59 (quoting Weeks Marine, Inc., 575 F.3d at 1361–62). 
 208. See id. at 1358, 1360. 
 209. Id. at 1359–60. 
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of the proposed Cerner contract were “not known.”210  The Federal 
Circuit noted that this was “not a case where a plaintiff is unable to 
demonstrate its ability to compete due to a lack of information about 
what is required.”211  Instead, the Federal Circuit found that CliniComp 
lacked standing “because it failed to demonstrate an ability to perform 
specific requirements that are set forth in the administrative record.”212 
Finally, the Federal Circuit was unpersuaded by CliniComp’s 
contention that it could have hired subcontractors to assist it in 
completing the work.  The Federal Circuit found that CliniComp’s 
“vague, cursory references to using subcontractors to perform the 
work it is unable to do are insufficient to cure CliniComp’s otherwise 
deficient showing that it is a qualified bidder.”213 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in CliniComp shows that contractors 
protesting sole source awards or the terms of a solicitation must 
provide sufficient evidence to show that they are qualified to compete. 
G.   Progressive Industries, Inc. v. United States 
Progressive Industries, Inc. v. United States214 involves a disappointed 
bidder’s noncompliance with procedural deadlines.  The VA solicited 
proposals to procure medical gases for its medical facilities.215  After 
being notified that it had not been awarded the contracts, Progressive 
filed a bid protest in the Court of Federal Claims arguing that it was 
treated unfairly when the VA established the competitive range.216  
The court sustained Progressive’s protest in part and enjoined the VA 
from awarding the contracts.217 
The day after judgment was entered, the VA filed a status report 
explaining that it planned to award emergency bridge contracts to 
the original awardees while it re-solicited the contracts.218  Three 
weeks later, following some back-and-forth relating to Progressive’s 
ability to seek costs and attorney fees, the Court of Federal Claims 
entered an amended judgment that removed a sentence reading, “No 
                                               
 210. Id. at 1360. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1360–61. 
 214. 888 F.3d 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 215. Id. at 1249–50. 
 216. Progressive Indus., Inc. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 457, 469–70 (2016). 
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costs.”219  A month later, Progressive filed a motion for reconsideration 
of amended judgment, requesting that the VA reevaluate the bid 
proposals in the competitive range instead of re-soliciting the 
contract.220  The Court of Federal Claims denied Progressive’s motion 
as untimely.  According to Rule 59(e) of the Rules of the Court of 
Federal Claims, to be timely, Progressive had to submit a motion for 
reconsideration within twenty-eight days after entry of judgment.221  
The Court of Federal Claims held that the time for filing a motion for 
reconsideration began on the date of the court’s original judgment, 
not its amended judgment.222 
Progressive appealed to the Federal Circuit.223  In a decision 
authored by Chief Judge Prost and joined by Judge Reyna and Senior 
Judge Mayer, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision 
and explained that the amended judgment merely changed the 
collateral issue of costs, and thus did not restart the time for filing:  
“[T]he original judgment in this case ended the litigation on the merits, 
and any ongoing disputes regarding costs or attorney fees were merely 
collateral issues . . . .  Moreover, Progressive’s Rule 59(e) motion addressed 
matters that had not been modified by the amended judgment.”224 
Progressive also tried to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) of the 
Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, which “states that ‘the court 
may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding’ for ‘any other reason that justifies relief.’”225  
However, the court can grant this form of relief only under 
“extraordinary circumstances.”226  Progressive argued on appeal that 
“extraordinary circumstances” existed because it would be excluded 
from the re-solicited contract due to the VA’s intent to set aside the 
                                               
 219. Id. at 1251–52. 
 220. Id. at 1252. 
 221. See id. at 1252–53 & n.4 (noting that Rule 59(e) of the Rules of the Court of 
Federal Claims is the same as Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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 223. Id. at 1252. 
 224. Id. at 1254 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 225. Id. at 1255 & n.11 (quoting Rule 60(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of 
Federal Claims) (commenting that language of Rule 60(b)(6) is the same as Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 226. Id. at 1255 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 
847, 863 (1988)). 
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contract for Service-Disabled Veteran Owned Small Businesses.227  
The Federal Circuit found that the Court of Federal Claims did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Progressive’s motion: 
In denying Progressive’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the [Court of 
Federal Claims] noted that Progressive could have raised its 
concerns regarding the potential impact of Kingdomware before the 
original judgment was entered.  Although Progressive attempts to 
explain its rationale for not doing so, there is no indication that 
Progressive was somehow prevented from raising this issue earlier.  
And, regardless, it is unclear whether Progressive would have been 
able to avoid the application of Kingdomware even if Progressive had 
raised the issue prior to judgment.228 
The decision in Progressive Industries shows that protesters need to 
be diligent about adhering to procedural deadlines, even after 
obtaining a favorable judgment. 
II.    CONTRACT DISPUTES 
A.   Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States 
In 1978, Congress passed the Contracts Disputes Act (CDA) with 
the stated purpose of providing “a fair, balanced, and comprehensive 
statutory system of legal and administrative remedies in resolving 
government contract claims.”229  The CDA also “removed the contract 
disputes process from the discretionary realm of agency-imposed 
contract clauses and established a fixed statutory framework that 
continues to this day.”230  But after the CDA’s passage, a range of 
judicial decisions and interpretative issues arose that “began to 
obstruct the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of disputes 
called for by [the CDA].”231  In a recent example of these 
interpretative issues, Securiforce International America, LLC v. United 
States232 adds further complexity to the role that the Court of Federal 
                                               
 227. Id. at 1255–56.  The VA intended to set aside the contract following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
1969 (2016).  Progressive argued that it would be excluded because the two original 
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 228. Progressive Indus., 888 F.3d at 1256. 
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Claims and Board of Contract Appeals play in deciding arguments 
raised during the litigation of CDA claims. 
1. Background 
In early September 2011, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
awarded a requirements contract to Securiforce International America, 
LLC (Securiforce) for the delivery of fuel to eight sites in Iraq.233  Shortly 
thereafter, on September 26, 2011, DLA partially terminated the 
contract for convenience, descoping two sites from the contract.234  DLA 
then placed small orders for two of the remaining sites with delivery 
deadlines of October 24, 2011.235  In response, Securiforce repeatedly 
revised its projected delivery date into late November, well past the 
deadline.236  Consequently, DLA issued Securiforce a show cause notice 
seeking explanation for the delays or risk a default termination.237  
Securiforce offered various purported government breaches as causes 
for the delays, including the allegedly improper termination for 
convenience, but gave no firm delivery date for the two orders.238  
Without assurances that Securiforce would perform, DLA terminated 
the contract for default on November 15, 2011.239 
Nearly one year later, on November 6, 2012, Securiforce filed a 
complaint with the Court of Federal Claims.  Securiforce requested 
declaratory relief that the termination for default was invalid and 
that, due to its prior material breaches, the government could not 
avail itself of the alternative remedy of termination for 
convenience.240  Alternatively, Securiforce sought a declaration that 
the default be converted to termination for convenience.241 
On November 16, 2012, ten days after filing its complaint, 
Securiforce sent a letter to the contracting officer requesting a final 
decision that the termination for convenience was a material breach 
of contract entitling Securiforce to damages.242  On January 16, 2013, 
the contracting officer responded that Securiforce did not present a 
                                               
 233. Securiforce Int’l Am., LLC v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 749, 754 (2016). 
 234. Id. at 756–57. 
 235. Id. at 760–61. 
 236. Id. at 761. 
 237. Id. at 778. 
 238. Id. at 762. 
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cognizable claim because the letter “failed to state a sum certain and 
it did not ‘make any reference to seeking an adjustment or 
interpretation of the contract terms.’”243  The contracting officer also 
indicated that Securiforce’s allegation of an improper termination 
for convenience was “likely without merit.”244 
Upon receipt of the contracting officer’s letter, Securiforce amended 
its complaint to challenge the “deemed denial” of its November 16, 2012 
request for final decision.245  Among other things, Securiforce requested 
that the court “enter a declaratory judgment that the terminations were 
invalid; that, due to its prior material breaches, and other breaches, the 
government may not avail itself of its termination for convenience 
remedy, either directly or as an alternative to its improper default; and 
that Securiforce is entitled to breach damages.”246 
Judge Horn held that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction 
over both termination challenges under the CDA.  She found that the 
termination for convenience was improper, but that the termination 
for default was proper.247  Securiforce appealed Judge Horn’s decision 
on the default termination.  The government cross-appealed, 
contending that the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over 
Securiforce’s claim of entitlement to breach damages.248 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Dyk and joined by 
Judges O’Malley and Wallach, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Court 
of Federal Claims’s ruling that the termination for default was 
proper.  But the Federal Circuit also held that the Court of Federal 
Claims lacked jurisdiction over Securiforce’s challenge to the prior 
termination for convenience because Securiforce failed to state a sum 
certain in its November 2012 letter to the contracting officer.249  
Consequently, the Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal 
Claims’s entry of judgement with respect to the termination for 
convenience and remanded with instructions to dismiss that claim.250 
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The Federal Circuit held that the contractor’s termination for 
convenience challenge was a monetary claim, regardless of how it was 
styled.  The Federal Circuit also found that the contractor’s failure to 
present or certify a “sum certain” to the contracting officer in its 
letter seeking a final decision rendered the claim “insufficient” and 
precluded jurisdiction because the Court of Federal Claims has 
jurisdiction only over a contracting officer’s final decision on a valid 
CDA claim.251  To determine whether the relief sought is monetary or 
non-monetary, the Federal Circuit noted that it looks to the 
substance of the pleadings, not the form.  It explained that “[i]f ‘the 
only significant consequence’ of the declaratory relief sought ‘would 
be that [the plaintiff] would obtain monetary damages from the 
federal government,’ the claim is in essence a monetary one.”252 
The Federal Circuit concluded that Securiforce’s termination for 
convenience challenge was a monetary claim.  It observed that 
Securiforce’s own November 2012 letter to the contracting officer 
“asked the [contracting officer] to decide whether ‘Securiforce is 
entitled to breach damages,’ without specifying an amount,”253 and 
that, after the Court of Federal Claims ruled in Securiforce’s favor, 
the contractor “sent an additional letter to the [contracting officer], 
for the first time quantifying its damages as $47 million.”254  
Consequently, “Securiforce’s failure to present this sum certain to the 
[contracting officer] in its November 2012 letter rendered its claim 
insufficient,” and left the Court of Federal Claims without jurisdiction 
                                               
 251. Id. at 1360.  There is no “sum-certain” requirement in the CDA itself; that 
requirement comes from the definition of claim in the FAR.  See FAR 2.101 (defining 
“claim” as a “written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties 
seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain”).  The Federal 
Circuit has long treated the FAR’s definition of a claim as controlling for 
determining when CDA jurisdiction exists.  See Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 
1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  Treating the sum-certain and similar 
requirements as jurisdictional prerequisites to CDA litigation is at least questionable 
in light of recent Supreme Court precedent.  See Nathaniel E. Castellano, After 
Arbaugh:  Neither Claim Submission, Certification, nor Timely Appeal are Jurisdictional 
Prerequisites to Contract Disputes Act Litigation, 47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 35, 68 (2017) 
(“Because claim submission is not jurisdictional, it follows that neither are any of the 
judicially and administratively conjured elements of claim submission—e.g., the need 
to demand a ‘sum-certain’ . . . .”). 
 252. Securiforce Int’l Am., 879 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc. 
v. United States, 144 F.3d 784, 787 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 253. Id. at 1360–61. 
 254. Id. at 1361. 
1410 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1373 
 
to “entertain Securiforce’s declaratory judgment claim with respect to 
the termination for convenience.”255 
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Tucker Act provides 
the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over “some non-monetary 
disputes,” but found that this statutory language “did not relieve 
parties’ obligations to comply with the separate requirements of the 
CDA, including the statement of a sum certain where, as here, the 
party is in essence seeking monetary relief.”256  In addition, the court 
observed that, even if Securiforce’s affirmative challenge to the 
termination for convenience was “properly characterized as 
nonmonetary,” the Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain the claim because it has discretion to grant declaratory relief 
only in “narrow circumstances,” such as “during contract performance.”  
This includes when there is “‘a fundamental question of contract 
interpretation or a special need for early resolution of a legal issue,’” but 
only if the legal remedies available to the parties are not adequate.257 
Based on the record, the Federal Circuit characterized 
Securiforce’s termination for convenience challenge as epitomizing 
“a circumstance where ‘the legal remedies . . . would be adequate to 
protect [Securiforce’s] interests.’”258  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
“damages are always the default remedy for breach of contract,”259 and 
thus, “[a] contractor’s request for declaratory judgment that the 
government materially breached a contract by terminating for 
convenience . . . would violate ‘the traditional rule that courts will not 
grant equitable relief when money damages are adequate.’”260 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion then addressed the Court of Federal 
Claims’s jurisdiction to entertain the contractor’s affirmative defense of 
prior material breach, including the improper termination for 
convenience defense, to the default termination.  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that the default termination was a government claim and that 
the common law material breach defense did not require the payment 
of money or an adjustment or interpretation of the contract terms.261  
The Federal Circuit’s holding in Securiforce thus distinguishes between 
                                               
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. (quoting Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260, 1271 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 258. Id. (quoting Alliant, 178 F.3d at 1271). 
 259. Id. at 1361–62. 
 260. Id. at 1362. 
 261. Id. at 1362–63. 
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jurisdiction over claims used as “swords” to seek affirmative relief and 
claims used as “shields” to defend against or negate a government claim. 
The Federal Circuit explained that the rule articulated in M. 
Maropakis Carpentry Co. v. United States262 applies only to those defenses 
that “seek the payment of money or the adjustment or interpretation 
of the contract terms.”263  In Maropakis, the Federal Circuit held that 
contractors must comply with the CDA’s jurisdictional and 
procedural prerequisites to assert an affirmative defense against a 
government claim.  The Federal Circuit thus clarified in Securiforce that 
a contractor need not meet the CDA’s jurisdictional prerequisites to 
assert an affirmative defense to the contract as written, including the 
defense of prior material breach.264 
Finding that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to 
entertain that defense, the Federal Circuit then turned to the merits 
and determined that the government did not breach the contract by 
partially terminating it for convenience, nor did the termination for 
convenience amount to an abuse of discretion.265 
B.   Meridian Engineering Co. v. United States 
1.  Background 
Meridian Engineering Co. v. United States266 involved a classic 
construction contract dispute.  In 2007, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers contracted with Meridian Engineering Company to 
perform flood control work in relation to the Chula Vista Project.267  
The project required Meridian to demolish and reconstruct a 
highway bridge in Arizona by adding concrete flood channels and 
relocating a sewer line.268 
After contract formation and once performance was underway, 
Meridian encountered “subsurface organic/unsuitable material” at 
the job site, “specifically, ‘a layer of dripping saturated dark clay 
                                               
 262. 609 F.3d 1323, 1326–32 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 263. Securiforce Int’l Am., 879 F.3d at 1362 (citation omitted).  For further 
discussion of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Maropakis, see Schooner, supra note 10, 
at 1095–99; Steven L. Schooner & Pamela J. Kovacs, Affirmatively Inefficient 
Jurisprudence?:  Confusing Contractors’ Rights to Raise Affirmative Defense with Sovereign 
Immunity, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 685, 702 (2012). 
 264. Securiforce Int’l Am., 879 F.3d at 1362–63. 
 265. Id. at 1364, 1367. 
 266. 885 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 267. Id. at 1354. 
 268. Id. 
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material under which a clean layer of sand is producing water’ that 
had ‘the potential for serious structural damage.’”269  In response, the 
Army modified the contract to provide increased funding, yet 
subsequent structural failures eventually resulted in the government 
suspending work and ultimately terminating the contract.270 
Following failed negotiations as to termination costs, Meridian filed 
a twelve-count complaint at the Court of Federal Claims.271  The 
Court of Federal Claims denied the vast majority of Meridian’s 
claims.272  On the question of whether Meridian was entitled to be 
paid for certain work it completed, the court ordered Meridian to 
provide the government with all relevant invoices and directed the 
parties to attempt to negotiate a settlement.273 
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
Meridian appealed, challenging the Court of Federal Claims’s 
decision on several grounds.274  In an opinion authored by Judge 
Wallach, joined by Judge Reyna and Chief Judge Prost, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part the 
Court of Federal Claims’s decision.275 
This long and complex decision affirms most of the Court of 
Federal Claims’s conclusions and summarily denies many of 
Meridian’s arguments presented on appeal.  First, Meridian argued 
that the Court of Federal Claims erred in analyzing Meridian’s claims 
as “breach” claims instead of analyzing them “under the framework 
contemplated by the CDA.”276  The Federal Circuit quickly dismissed 
this argument, noting that “Meridian does not explain the alternate 
CDA framework to which it refers, nor does it state how analysis 
under a different hypothetical framework would result in a finding in 
its favor.”277  The decision explains that “the CDA itself does not 
provide a cause of action to which money damages may accrue; it is the 
                                               
 269. Id. (citations omitted). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See Meridian Eng’g Co. v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 381, 396–97 (2015) 
(listing Meridian’s claims, including health hazards, flood events, unpaid contract 
quantities, suspension of work, and channel fill). 
 272. Id. at 426. 
 273. See id. at 396–97, 414, 426 (describing the various work performed and the 
associated reports provided to the government). 
 274. See generally Meridian, 885 F.3d at 1353–54. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. at 1355. 
 277. Id. 
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claim asserted pursuant to the CDA that is the source of potential 
damages and review by the trier of fact.”278  Second, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Court of Federal Claims’s findings that Meridian failed to 
establish liability with respect to its differing site conditions claims.  
Essentially, the Federal Circuit agreed with the Court of Federal Claims’s 
findings that a reasonable contractor would have foreseen the site 
conditions Meridian encountered.279  Third, Meridian challenged the 
Court of Federal Claims’s decision to consolidate Meridian’s differing 
site conditions claim with its separate claim that the government 
provided defective specifications.  The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
lower court that the arguments were so intertwined as to effectively 
constitute a single claim.280 
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held in favor of Meridian with 
respect to three issues, resulting in remand for further proceedings.  
First, because Meridian and the government both agreed that the 
Court of Federal Claims erred in determining when interest would 
begin to accrue, the Federal Circuit remanded with instructions to 
recalculate interest.281  Second, the Federal Circuit held that the 
Court of Federal Claims provided insufficient analysis to support its 
conclusion that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction precluded 
Meridian’s claim seeking damages for government-caused delays that 
forced Meridian to work in inclement weather.282  Specifically, the 
Court of Federal Claims found accord and satisfaction without 
adequately considering evidence presented by Meridian suggesting 
that there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties.283  
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal Claims 
erred in its conclusion that the government had already paid 
Meridian sufficiently to cover Meridian’s entitlement for certain 
“unpaid contract quantities” based on the government’s right under 
FAR 52.232-5 to withhold a percentage of progress payments if there 
is a lack of “satisfactory progress.”284  Because there was no allegation 
of unsatisfactory performance, the Federal Circuit held that the 
government’s right to withhold under FAR 52.232-5 was 
                                               
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. at 1355–60. 
 280. Id. at 1360–61. 
 281. Id. at 1354 n.2. 
 282. See id. at 1362–65. 
 283. Id. at 1364 n.12. 
 284. See id. at 1365–67 (quoting FAR 52.232-5 (2018)). 
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inapplicable.285  The Federal Circuit thus remanded for further 
proceedings on the amount Meridian is entitled to recover for the 
“unpaid contract quantities.”286 
C.   K-CON, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army 
In K-Con, Inc. v. Secretary of the Army,287 the Federal Circuit held that 
the mandatory bonding requirements at FAR 52.228-15 are subject to 
the doctrine set forth in G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States288 
and were thus automatically incorporated by operation of law into 
two contracts for the construction of pre-engineered metal 
buildings.289  The decision also highlighted the need for contractors 
to seek clarification when faced with a potentially patent ambiguity as 
to the type of acquisition being sought by the government. 
1. Background 
In September 2013, the Army awarded K-Con, Inc. two contracts 
for pre-engineered metal buildings at Camp Edwards, 
Massachusetts.290  One contract was to design and construct a laundry 
facility, and the other was to construct a communications equipment 
shelter.291  The government issued both solicitations using Standard 
Form 1449, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items, and 
neither solicitation mentioned performance and payment bond 
requirements.292  A month after the contract award, the Army 
requested that K-Con provide performance and payment bonds 
pursuant to FAR 28.102-1, which “requires performance and payment 
bonds for any construction contract exceeding $150,000.”293  K-Con 
provided the required performance bonds and, in January 2016, sent 
the Army a certified claim in the amount of $116,336.56 for the 
increases in cost and labor.294 
                                               
 285. Id. at 1366. 
 286. Id. at 1366–67. 
 287. 908 F.3d 719 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 288. See G.L. Christian & Assoc. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 427 (Ct. Cl. 1963) 
(holding that “it is both fitting and legally sound to read the termination article 
required by the Procurement Regulations as necessarily applicable to the present 
contract and therefore as incorporated into it by operation of law”). 
 289. K-Con, Inc., 908 F.3d at 727–28. 
 290. Id. at 721. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 721–22. 
 293. Id. at 722, 725 (quoting FAR 28.102-1(a) (2017)). 
 294. Id. at 722. 
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The Contracting Officer for the Army rejected the requests on two 
grounds.  First, the Contracting Officer stated that the bonds were 
mandatory because the contracts were for construction.  Second, the 
Contracting Officer asserted that the bond requirements were assumed 
to be in the contract pursuant to the Christian doctrine.295  K-Con 
appealed the Army’s decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals, and the Board affirmed the Army’s denial of K-Con’s claim.296  
2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
K-Con appealed to the Federal Circuit and raised two arguments:  
(1) the contracts were for commercial items instead of construction 
and were thus not required to have the bond requirements; and (2) 
even if the contracts were for construction, the Board erred in 
holding that the bond requirements could be incorporated into the 
contracts by operation of law pursuant to the Christian doctrine.297 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision on both 
grounds.298  In an opinion authored by Judge Stoll and joined by 
Judge Reyna and Senior Judge Bryson, the Federal Circuit held that 
the contracts were patently ambiguous as to whether they were for 
construction or commercial items, meaning that “the contract[s] 
contain[ed] facially inconsistent provisions that would place a 
reasonable contractor on notice and prompt the contractor to rectify 
the inconsistency by inquiring of the appropriate parties.”299  K-Con 
thus had a duty, at the outset, to inquire as to whether the contracts 
were for construction or commercial items.  K-Con’s failure to do so 
precluded it from arguing that the contracts were for commercial items.300  
The court reasoned that the ambiguity in the contracts was obvious because 
they were issued using the standard commercial items contract form, while 
the details in the contracts clearly referred to construction activities.301 
                                               
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 721, 722. 
 297. Id. at 722. 
 298. Id. at 727–28. 
 299. Id. at 722 (quoting Stratos Mobile Networks USA, LLC v. United States, 213 
F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 300. See id. at 723 (“Because the solicitations contained contract language that was 
patently ambiguous, K-Con cannot argue that its interpretation was proper unless K-
Con contemporaneously sought clarification of the language from the Army.  K-Con 
did not seek such clarification and therefore cannot now argue that the contracts 
should be for commercial items.” (citation omitted)). 
 301. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit also found that the Board did not err when it 
applied the Christian doctrine to the performance and payment bond 
requirements at FAR part 28.302  Under the Christian doctrine, a 
contract clause will be incorporated by operation of law into a 
government contract if:  (1) the clause is mandatory under the FAR, 
and (2) the clause “expresses a significant or deeply ingrained strand 
of public procurement policy.”303  The Federal Circuit found that the 
performance bond clauses were mandatory because they were 
required by statute, namely, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–34, formerly known as the 
Miller Act.304  The statute states that performance and payment bonds 
“must” be furnished in construction contracts worth more than 
$100,000.305  It was later implemented into the FAR and required that the 
bond clauses be inserted into construction contracts and solicitations.306 
K-Con contended that the clauses were not mandatory because the 
Contracting Officer had the discretion to waive the bond 
requirement.307  However, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument: 
That the contracting officer could revise the bond requirements 
does not change the fact that the bonding requirements are 
mandatory for construction contracts over $150,000, like the 
contracts here.  Instead, the words “must” and “shall” in the 
statutory and regulatory language establish that the requirement to 
furnish performance and payment bonds is mandatory.308 
With respect to the second prong of the Christian doctrine analysis, 
the Federal Circuit discussed the legislative history of the Miller Act 
and concluded that the bond requirements were “deeply ingrained” 
in procurement policy.309  To start, it explained that since 
government property cannot be subjected to subcontractors’ and 
suppliers’ liens, payment bonds were created in government 
contracts to provide an alternative remedy for those who supply labor 
or materials to a contractor on a federal project.310  It also explained that 
                                               
 302. Id. at 725, 727. 
 303. Id. at 724 (citing Gen. Eng’g & Mach. Works v. O’Keefe, 991 F.2d 775, 779 
(Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 304. See id. at 724–25. 
 305. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 3131(b) (2012)).  The threshold has since been raised 
to $150,000.  FAR 28.102-1(a) (2017); see also K-Con, Inc., 908 F.3d at 724 n.4 (noting 
that the regulation contains a higher threshold than the statute). 
 306. K-Con, Inc., 908 F.3d at 724–25. 
 307. Id. at 725. 
 308. Id. (citing Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016)). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
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performance bonds were made to ensure that federal contracts get 
completed without additional costs in the event of a default.311  The 
Miller Act expressly required these bonds to protect both of these 
interests.  Thus, the Federal Circuit found that the statute was “deeply 
ingrained” in public policy.312 
D.   Agility Logistics Services Co. KSC v. Mattis 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Agility Logistics Services Co. KSC v. 
Mattis313 holds that CDA jurisdiction does not extend to claims arising 
under contracts formed with the Iraqi Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA).314  This holding turns on the finding that the U.S. government 
is not actually a contracting party to CPA contracts, even where task 
orders under a CPA contract were issued and administered by a U.S. 
agency and obligated U.S. funds.315 
1. Background 
The United States and its coalition partners created the CPA in 
2003 to govern Iraq while awaiting the constitution of a new Iraqi 
government.316  Shortly thereafter, the CPA formed an umbrella contract 
with Agility to establish and operate distribution center warehouses and 
staging areas as part of a supply chain management system.317 
Agility’s umbrella contract with the CPA stated that obligations 
under the contract would be made with Iraqi funds, not the funds of 
any coalition member country.318  The umbrella contract also 
anticipated a transfer of authority from the CPA to an Iraqi Interim 
Government, at which point the CPA would be dissolved.319  In doing 
so, the umbrella contract disclaimed U.S. liability for performance 
after the transfer:  “The CPA, U.S. Government or Coalition 
                                               
 311. Id. at 725–26. 
 312. Id. at 726. 
 313. 887 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 314. Id. at 1145–46. 
 315. See generally Ralph C. Nash, Puzzling Decisions:  Is Issuing Task Orders Contract 
Administration?, 32 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 27 (June 2018) (noting that the Federal 
Circuit found that the contracts were only “issued by” a government agency, not 
“made by” the government). 
 316. Agility, 887 F.3d at 1146. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
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Government will not be liable to the contractor for any performance 
undertaken after the [transfer of authority].”320 
Once governing authority was transferred from the CPA to the 
interim government, responsibility for administering CPA contracts 
fell to the Project and Contracting Office, a temporary department 
created within the U.S. Army that subsequently issued a series of task 
orders to Agility under the CPA umbrella contract.321  Despite 
language in the umbrella contract that all obligations under it would 
be made with Iraqi funds, several of the task orders issued by the 
Army in fact obligated U.S. funds.322 
In 2010, a U.S. contracting officer issued final decisions claiming 
over $81 million for alleged overpayments made to Agility during 
performance of task orders under the CPA contract.323  Each 
contracting officer decision contained standard CDA language 
pertaining to a contractor’s right to appeal, and Agility appealed all 
but one of the contracting officer’s decisions to the Armed Services 
Board of Contract Appeals.324  Agility also submitted to the contracting 
officer a claim of its own for $47 million in unpaid invoices submitted 
under the CPA contract.325  The Contracting Officer denied Agility’s 
claim, and Agility also appealed that denial to the Board.326 
The government moved to dismiss Agility’s appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction, and the Board granted the government’s motion.327  The 
Board reasoned that its jurisdiction under the CDA extends only to 
contracts made by executive agencies, and that “the CPA, created by a 
coalition of nation states, is not a federal executive agency for 
purposes of CDA jurisdiction.”328  Thus, absent evidence that the CPA 
contract was novated or assigned to a U.S. executive agency, the 
United States acted as a contract administrator, not a contracting 
party, and the Board lacked jurisdiction.329 
                                               
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 1147. 
 322. See id. at 1146–47 (noting that the twelve task orders at issue in the case 
obligated U.S. funds). 
 323. Id. at 1147–48. 
 324. Id. at 1148; Appeals of Agility Logistics Servs. Co. KSC, ASBCA No. 57415, 15-
1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 35840, 2014 WL 7260693 (Dec. 9, 2014). 
 325. Agility, 887 F.3d at 1148. 
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2. The Federal Circuit’s decision 
Agility appealed to the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
the Board decision in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Prost and 
joined by Judges Lourie and Chen.330  As with the Board’s decision, the 
Federal Circuit’s decision turned on the assertion that CDA 
jurisdiction applies only to contracts made by an executive agency.331 
In essence, the Federal Circuit declined to accept any argument 
that the U.S. government’s actions administering the CPA contract, 
however involved, could transform the U.S. government from a 
contract administrator, or an agent of the CPA or its successors, into 
a contracting party.332  According to the Federal Circuit, it was irrelevant 
that the U.S. government issued and administered the task orders and 
obligated U.S. funds.  The Federal Circuit found “that even if an executive 
agency issued the Task Orders, it did so as a contract administrator and 
not as a contracting party.”  The Federal Circuit thus concluded that “the 
Task Orders were not ‘made by’” an executive agency.333 
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit’s decision was driven by language in the 
umbrella CPA contract expressly stating that the “U.S. Government . . . will 
not be liable . . . for any performance undertaken after the” transfer of 
authority from the CPA to the interim government.334 
While unlikely to impact the vast majority of traditional CDA 
claims, the Agility decision is critically important for any contractor 
that entered into a contract with the CPA.  Absent distinct contractual 
provisions that may implicate U.S. government liability, or 
subsequent novation to a U.S. executive agency, appeals brought 
under the CDA from contracting officer decisions relating to CPA 
contracts are likely to face motions to dismiss by the government. 
III.    OTHER TUCKER ACT JURISDICTION CASES 
The Tucker Act of 1887 was passed by Congress to cement the 
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Claims—today, the Court of Federal 
Claims—to adjudicate monetary claims against the U.S. government 
based on the Constitution, statute or regulation, or “upon any 
                                               
 330. Agility, 887 F.3d at 1145. 
 331. Id. at 1148–49. 
 332. See id. at 1149–51. 
 333. Id. at 1151. 
 334. Id. 
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express or implied contract with the United States.”335  While most of 
the contractual disputes heard by the Court of Federal Claims today 
arise under the CDA,336 the court will sometimes be called upon to 
resolve other claims against the government that fall outside the scope 
of the CDA but are still based upon a “contract with the United States.” 
A.   Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States 
Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United States337 involves the scope of Tucker Act 
jurisdiction, particularly 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), and the circumstances 
under which that jurisdiction can be displaced by a separate, 
comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
In 1996, Alpine PCS, Inc. (Alpine), a small wireless 
telecommunications company, contracted with the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to obtain two ten-year “personal 
communication services” licenses in California.338  Alpine was to pay for 
the licenses in installments during the ten-year period.339  In January 
2002, Alpine failed to make payment, triggering a regulation that 
provided Alpine three months to pay the amount in full plus late 
fees.340  If the payment was not made, the license was to “automatically 
cancel.”341  One week before the deadline, Alpine asked the FCC if it 
could restructure the payment plan and waive the automatic 
cancellation provision.342  Due to a change in the FCC’s database, the 
licenses reverted back to the FCC.343  Alpine alleged that the FCC 
assured them that the reversion was a clerical error.344 
In January 2007, the FCC denied both of Alpine’s requests to 
restructure, causing Alpine to default.345  Alpine filed a petition for 
reconsideration with the FCC.346  While the petition was pending, the 
                                               
 335. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012)); see 
also Swan, supra note 3, at 108 (noting that the Tucker Act constitutes “the bedrock waiver 
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FCC announced a new auction offering the cancelled licenses.347  
Alpine asked the FCC to stay the auction until a decision was made on 
the petition, but the FCC refused.348  In 2008, Alpine filed for 
bankruptcy.349  In 2010, Alpine appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, which ultimately affirmed the FCC’s decision.350 
In 2013, Alpine brought another suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia alleging various theories of breach of 
contract.351  The District Court dismissed Alpine’s claim for lack of 
jurisdiction on the basis that, pursuant to the regulatory regime 
created by the Federal Communications Act,352 only the D.C. Circuit 
could hear Alpine’s claim against the FCC.  The D.C. Circuit affirmed 
this jurisdictional ruling.353 
On January 4, 2016, Alpine brought another suit against the FCC—
this time in the Court of Federal Claims—alleging that the FCC 
breached the contracts by unilaterally placing Alpine in default on 
the licenses, and the FCC’s cancellation of the licenses constituted a 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.354  Court of Federal Claims Judge 
Lettow dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.355  He explained that the 
“specific and comprehensive” statutory scheme within the Federal 
Communications Act preempted the Court of Federal Claims’s 
jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.356  As for the takings claim, he found 
that the claim accrued when the licenses were re-auctioned, and thus were 
barred by the Tucker Act’s six-year jurisdictional statute of limitations.357 
Alpine appealed to the Federal Circuit.358  In an unanimous 
decision authored by Judge Taranto and joined by Judges Moore and 
Reyna, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Alpine’s case for 
lack of jurisdiction.359  The Federal Circuit framed the issue as whether 
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Tucker Act jurisdiction was displaced by the Federal Communication 
Act’s specific and comprehensive regulatory scheme.360  Alpine argued 
that it was challenging the “breach of a contract that resulted in 
forfeiture of [the] licenses” and not the revocation of its licenses, but 
the Federal Circuit found, “[t]hat distinction is an empty one.”361  The 
Federal Circuit held that the Federal Communications Act displaces 
the Tucker Act by providing Alpine a comprehensive vehicle to obtain 
an administrative and judicial remedy for its breach of contract claims, 
noting that Alpine had already taken advantage of that remedial 
scheme in 2002 and 2010.362 
B.   Lee v. United States 
Lee v. United States363 involved a class action claim against the 
government alleging breach of a non-procurement contract.364  The 
decision demonstrated the difficulties of recovering under breach of 
implied contract theories where an express contract already exists. 
The plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit were hired by the 
government through individual purchase order vendor (POV) 
contracts to provide services to Voice of America, a government-
funded broadcast service.365  The plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of 
Federal Claims, alleging that the government breached their POV 
contracts by failing to provide them with the salary and benefits 
appropriate for federal employees or personal service contractors.366  The 
plaintiffs sought damages under three theories:  (1) breach of express 
contract, (2) breach of implied-in-fact contract, and (3) quantum meruit.367 
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Judge Lettow of the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the case and 
declined to allow the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint 
on the basis that doing so would be futile.368  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed in a unanimous decision authored by Senior Judge Bryson 
and joined by Judges Reyna and Stoll.369 
With respect to the breach of express contract theory, the plaintiffs 
argued that, although the government treated the plaintiffs as 
employees or personal service contractors during performance of the 
contracts, the government failed to provide the salary and benefits to 
which federal employees and personal service contractors are 
entitled.  The Federal Circuit rejected this theory, noting that the 
plaintiffs’ contracts stated that the plaintiffs were independent 
contractors and did not suggest that the government was obligated to 
provide the wages or benefits owed to federal employees or personal 
service contractors.  The Federal Circuit noted that “the plaintiffs 
fail[ed] to identify any specific provision of the representative 
contracts that was breached; instead, they relied on general 
allegations regarding the rights normally enjoyed by independent 
contractors.”370  The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the plaintiffs 
“failed to state a claim for breach of express contract” because their 
allegations were “not tied to the rights and obligations of the parties 
defined by the contracts.”371 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that the 
government breached an implied-in-fact contract to compensate them 
as federal employees or personal service contractors.  It held that an 
implied-in-fact contract could not exist because the plaintiffs already 
had an express contract that covered the same subject matter.372 
The plaintiffs attempted to save their implied contract claim by 
arguing that the express contracts were void because they violated FAR 
37.104,373 which only allows the government to award personal service 
contracts if they are specifically permitted under law.374  The Federal 
Circuit rejected this argument as well.  It concluded that the contracts 
did not violate FAR 37.104, and explained that, even if the contracts 
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did violate the FAR, such a violation itself is not sufficient to justify the 
extraordinary act of retroactively voiding a government contract.375 
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claim for 
recovery under a theory of quantum meruit.  The Federal Circuit 
explained that the Tucker Act generally does not provide jurisdiction 
over claims of quantum meruit, and the court held that a quantum 
meruit exception was insufficient to overcome the presumption 
against jurisdiction when the underlying implied-in-fact contract 
claim could not survive a motion to dismiss.376 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s government contracts decisions in 2018 were 
few but potent.  The court broke new ground by examining, for the 
first time, the government’s obligation under FASA to consider 
commercial sources; considered a follow-on issue related to the 
Supreme Court’s Kingdomware decision; and continued to struggle 
with the consequences of its 2010 decision in Maropakis.  Many—
although certainly not all—of the court’s decisions this year were 
consistent with the Federal Circuit’s strict constructionist approach to 
statutory and contractual interpretation.  This year’s decisions 
continue to demonstrate the court’s lack of specialized expertise in 
the area of government contracts and the importance of having 
advocates provide sufficient context surrounding the issues on appeal 
to enable the court to come to a fully informed decision. 
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